There was also Jordanian King Husayn’s participation in the war, a man who was a long-time, secret ally of Israel and known to share Arab military secrets with Tel Aviv.īut all those factors pale in comparison with the firm and constant official U.S. Lastly, there were indigenous reasons for the defeat, such as corruption in Arab governments and the appointment of an incompetent, unqualified man at the head of the Egyptian armed forces. and Western governments supported Israel. This was thanks to years of Western military and economic support and Western opposition to substantial arming of Arab states facing Israel.įurthermore, the Arabs lost the war because they did not have the support of the U.S.S.R.
government - according to various accounts, including that of William Quandt, in his “Peace Process” -never for a minute doubted that Israel would prevail against any combination of Arab armies.
Of course, the defeat had very clear material reasons: Israel had unlimited support from the U.S. For Al-Azm the defeat was the result of the failure of the mind and culture more than anything else.
#How to defeat angry red button chapter 5 series
Its chief peddler was Sadiq Jalal Al-Azm, a hardcore Syrian Marxist at the time who was known for calling any Arab intellectual who even met with American professors Mossad or CIA spies (see his book “Ziyarat As-Sadat”).Īl-Azm produced a series of articles that later formed a best-selling book, “Self-Criticism After the Defeat.” Translated and published in English in 2011 by the right-wing As-Saqi Books, with a forward by Fouad Ajami, it basically drew upon racist Orientalist assumptions and presumptions about Arabs - as Arabs - to hold the Arabs (as a culture, mentality and almost genetic makeup) responsible for the defeat. The left was also prolific in producing literature of defeat. military and political support for the Egyptian tyranny constructed by Sadat. It led him to visit Israel and seek not only peace with the Israeli occupation state but also to make an official pledge to remove Egypt from any Arab-Israeli confrontation or conflicts. This right-wing project would become the official policy of Egypt after Anwar Sadat assumed power in 1970 (following Nasser’s death). (I was 7 years-old at the time, in Lebanon, and still remember how adults took to the street in night clothes chanting “Oh, Nasser, oh Nasser, oh beloved we shall liberate Tel Aviv.”)Īlmost immediately after the defeat, two rival ideological camps converged to produce what I can only dub “the defeat industry.” Jordan and the Gulf regimes’ media (from the right) produced literature that basically doubted the whole venture of liberating Palestine and planted doubts and ideas in Arab minds pertaining to the futility of revolution and rejection. Later, massive pro-Nasser demonstrations in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world returned Nasser to power. (Sudanese military ruler, Muhammad Siwar Az-Zahab was another rare example in 1986). Nasser’s resignation was a rare occasion when an Arab leader abdicated voluntarily from power.
#How to defeat angry red button chapter 5 tv
As if to aid the Zionist rhetoric, Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian regime media resorted to wild exaggerations, and outright lies, about winning the war until June 9, when Egyptian leader Gamal Abdul-Nasser appeared on state TV and announced his resignation, while candidly (albeit belatedly) sharing the news of the defeat with the Arab people. The promises of victory, which filled the Arab press on the eve of defeat, made it all the more devastating. There is no question that the Arab armies were decisively defeated in 1967, and there is no question that the defeat was all the more humiliating given the bombast and exaggeration that surrounded Arab official rhetoric prior to the defeat. Egyptians protesting Nasser’s resignation in 1967.
0 kommentar(er)
